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The language of the basic logic of proofs extends the usual propositional lan-
guage by forming sentences of the sort x is a proof of F for any sentence F . In
this paper a complete axiomatization for the basic logic of proofs in Heyting
Arithmetic HA was found.
1 Introduction.
The classical logic of proofs LP inspired by the works by Kolmogorov [24] and Gödel
[16, 17] was found in [3, 4] (see also surveys [6, 8, 12]). LP is a natural extension of the
classical propositional logic in a language of proof-carrying formulas. LP axiomatizes
all valid logical principles concerning propositions and proofs with a fixed sufficiently
rich set of operations. Operations of proofs in LP suffice to recover explicit provability
content in the classical modal logic by realizing modalities by appropriate proof terms.
This helped to settle an old question discussed by Gödel in 1933/38 concerning the
intended provability semantics of the classical modal logic S4 and intuitionistic logic
IPC ([4]).
The logic of proofs LP naturally extends both the classical modal logic and typed
combinatory logic (hence the typed λ-calculus) [5]. This connection to modal logic led
to applications of LP in the logics of knowledge, where the proof-carrying language of
LP helped to capture the notions of “evidence” and “knowing for a reason” ([7, 9, 13]).
Another line of applications of the logic of proofs comes from the fact that LP
considerably extends the typed λ-calculus by providing the latter with reflexive capa-
bilities, which model reflection in typed theories and typed functional programming.
In this connection finding the intuitionistic logic of proofs, more precisely, the logic
of proofs for HA is an important task, since this logic could serve as a source of new
operations for the reflexive λ-calculi. The logic of proofs provides a proper format for
∗Supported by the Austrian Science Fund FWF under projects P16264, P16539 and P17503.
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reasoning about admissible rules in HA and studying their functional and algebraic
behavior. The intuitionistic logic of proofs provides a more expressive version of the
modal λ-calculus [11, 25, 26] which has interesting applications.
The problem of building the intuitionistic logic of proofs has two distinct parts.
Firstly, one has to answer the question about propositional logical principles that
axiomatize HA-tautologies in the propositional language enriched by atoms u is a proof
of F without operations on proof terms, i.e. when u is a variable. The resulting basic
logic of proofs will reflect purely logical principles of the chosen format. Secondly, one
has to pick a system of operations on proofs and study corresponding intuitionistic
logic of proofs. In this paper we will concentrate on solving the first of the above
problems and discuss the second one in section 4.
We introduce the Basic Intuitionistic Logic of Proofs, iBLP, and establish its com-
pleteness with respect to the semantics of proofs in HA. The paper essentially uses
technique and results by de Jongh [23], Smorynski [27], de Jongh and Visser work on
a basis for admissible rules in IPC (circa 1991, cf. [19]), Artemov & Strassen [10] and
Artemov [2], Ghilardi [14], Iemhoff [18, 20, 21].
Finally, let us remark that besides the reasons mentioned above, the completeness
proof presented in this paper is also interesting because it is the first result in this
area for constructive theories. For example, the correponding problem for provability
logic of Heyting Arithmetic is still open [22].
2 Preliminaries.
The language of the basic logic of proofs consists of the usual language of propositional
logic (with ⊥) plus proof variables u, v, w, . . .. Using u to stand for any proof variable
and p for any propositional variable or ⊥, the formulas are defined by the grammar
A ≡def p | A1 → A2 | A1 ∧A2 | A1 ∨A2 | u :A.
¬A is defined as A → ⊥. An atom is a propositional variable or ⊥ or a formula of the
form u :F . A literal is an atom or the negation of an atom. Note that we can consider
the language of the basic logic of proofs as a propositional language in which some
propositional variables, u : A, are labelled by a formula in the language. When we
write a formula in the context of IPC, e.g. in expressions 6`IPC A or |∼ IPCA, A should
be interpreted as a propositional formula in the way just explained. Subformulas are
defined as usual, with the extra clause that u :A and subformulas of A are subformulas
of u :A. We adhere to the convention that “u :” and “¬” bind stronger than “∧”, “∨”,
which bind stronger than “→”.
Definition 1. A proof predicate is a primitive recursive formula Prf (x, y) such that
for every arithmetical sentence ϕ
HA ` ϕ ⇔ for some n∈ω Prf (n, pϕq) holds1.
Definition 2. An arithmetical interpretation ∗ has the following parameters [2, 10].
1. a proof predicate Prf (x, y);
1We omit bars over numerals for natural numbers n, pϕq, etc.
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2. a mapping of propositional variables p to sentences p∗ of HA;
3. a mapping of proof variables u to natural numbers u∗.
The arithmetical interpretation F ∗ of a formula F is defined inductively
⊥∗ := (0 = 1), (A → B)∗ := A∗ → B∗, (u :A)∗ := Prf (u∗, pA∗q)
Naturally, an arithmetical interpretation of the iBLP-language can be considered as a
special case of the arithmetical substitution in the language of IPC.
2.1 Substitutions.
We will use two kinds of substitutions. Substitutions of propositional formulas for
propositional variables are denoted by σ or σ′. Substitutions of arithmetical formulas
for propositional variables are denoted by τ or τ ′. For a set of formulas Γ we write σΓ
for {σA | A ∈ Γ}. If formulas in the language of iBLP are involved, these substitutions
consider them as formulas in propositional logic in the way explained above, i.e. such
that expressions u :A are treated as propositional variables. For example σ(u :A) may
be any propositional formula, and σ(v : (u :p)) bears no connection to σ(u :p) or σp.
2.2 Admissible rules.
A (propositional) admissible rule of a logic L is a rule A/B, where A and B are
propositional formulas, such that adding the rule to the logic does not lead to new
theorems of L, i.e. for any substitution σ of formulas of L for propositional variables
`L σA implies `L σB.
We write A |∼ LB if A/B is an admissible rule of L. The rule is called derivable if
`L A → B and nonderivable if 6`L A → B. We say that a collection R of rules is
admissible for L if all rules in R are admissible for L. R is derivable for L if all rules
in R are derivable for L. We write A `RL B if B is derivable from A in the logic
consisting of L extended with the rules R, i.e. if there are A = A1, . . . , An = B such
that for all i < n, Ai `L Ai+1 or there exists a σ such that σBi/σBi+1 = Ai/Ai+1
and Bi/Bi+1 ∈ R. A set R of admissible rules of L is a basis for the admissible rules
of L if for every admissible rule A |∼ LB we have A `RL B.
2.2.1 The Visser Rules.












(Ai → Bi) → An+1 ∨An+2 /
( n∧
i=1
(Ai → Bi) → An+1 ∨An+2
)V
.
We denote {Vn | n ∈ ω} by V .
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Note that for such A of the form
n∧
i=1
(Ai → Bi) → An+1 ∨An+2
it classically holds that (A → ∨n+2i=1 Ai), whence also A → AV . This is in contrast
to IPC in which this is not derivable. As was first observed by D. de Jongh and A.
Visser, the rules V are admissible for IPC (cf. [19]). Whence they are non-derivable
admissible rules of IPC. Thus A |∼ IPCAV , while in general not A 6`IPC AV . Some
well-known admissible rules are instances of Visser’s rules, e.g. Harrop’s rule
¬A → B ∨ C |∼ (¬A → B) ∨ (¬A → C).
Namely, (¬A → B ∨C)V = (¬A → B)∨ (¬A → C)∨ (¬A → A). Since (¬A → A) ↔
¬¬A, (¬A → B ∨ C)V ↔ (¬A → B) ∨ (¬A → C).
The interest of the Visser rules lies in the fact that they form a basis for the
admissible rules of IPC and HA.
Theorem 1. [18, 19] The Visser rules form a basis for the admissible rules of IPC.
Theorem 2. [28] The propositional admissible rules of HA are the same as the ad-
missible rules of IPC.
2.3 Kripke models and the extension property.
Kripke models for intuitionistic propositional logic are defined as usual. We assume
our models to be rooted. We say that two Kripke models are variants of each other
when they have the same set of nodes and partial order, and their valuations agree
on all nodes except possibly the root. Given Kripke models K1, . . . , Kn, (ΣKi)′
denotes the Kripke model which is the result of attaching one new node at which
no propositional variables are forced, below all nodes in K1, . . . , Kn. (Σ)′ is called
the Smorynski operator. A class of models K has the extension property if for every
family of models K1, . . . ,Kn ∈ K, there is a variant of (
∑
i Ki)
′ which belongs to K.
A formula has the extension property if its class of models has the extension property.
2.4 Projective formulas.
Definition 4. A formula A is called projective if there exists a substitution σ, a
projective unifier of A, such that
`IPC σA and ∀B (A `IPC B ↔ σB).
A projective approximation ΠA of A is a set of projective formulas in which no other
variables occur than the ones that occur in A, and such that B ` A for all B ∈ ΠA,
and which is maximal as such, i.e. such that for every projective formula C such that
C ` A, there exists a B ∈ ΠA such that C ` B. In fact, in the definition of projective
approximation from [15] there is also a complexity bound on the formulas in ΠA, but
as we do not need it in the sequel, we have omitted it in the definition given here.
The properties that we use of ΠA remain the same under this omission. Define
ΠA ≡def {B | B is projective and B `IPC A}.
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Note that for projective A with projective unifier σ, {B | A `IPC B} = {B | `IPC σB}.
Thus A axiomatizes the logic of formulas valid in IPC under σ.
Theorem 3. (Ghilardi [15]).
1. A is projective if and only if A has the extension property.
2. Every consistent formula has a finite projective approximation.
3. For every σ such that `IPC σA, there is a B ∈ Π̄A such that `IPC σB.
Theorem 4. For each finite projective approximation ΠA of A, we have A `VIPC
∨
ΠA.
Proof. First we show that A |∼ IPC
∨
ΠA. Suppose that for some substitution σ,
`IPC σA. Then by the last part of the previous theorem it follows that there is a
B ∈ Π̄A such that `IPC σB. As ΠA is a projective approximation it follows that
B ` C for some C ∈ ΠA. Hence ` σC, and thus `IPC σ(
∨
ΠA). This proves that
A |∼ IPC
∨
ΠA. In [18] it has been shown that V is a basis for the admissible rules of
IPC, that is, that |∼ IPC is equivalent to `VIPC. Therefore, A `VIPC
∨
ΠA. 2
Projective formulas show special behavior with respect to admissibility: it is not
difficult to see that for projective formulas A and for all B we have that A |∼B if and
only if A ` B. Together with the fact that A |∼ ∨ΠA this implies that for all A
A |∼ IPCB if and only if
∨
ΠA `IPC B.
The direction from left to right follows from the fact that all formulas in ΠA are
projective and imply A. The other direction follows from the fact that A |∼
∨
ΠA.
Lemma 1. If A is projective then for all atoms p, if (A ∧ ¬p) is consistent then
(A ∧ ¬p) is projective.
Proof. Show that (A ∧ ¬p) has the extension property. 2
3 The Basic Logic of Proofs.
Definition 5. The basic intuitionistic logic of proofs, iBLP, consists of the following
axioms
A1 Theorems of IPC
A2 u :F → F
A3 u :F ∨ ¬u :F
A4
∧n
i=1(ui :Fi) → G for Fi, G such that
(∧n
i=1(Fi ∧ ui :Fi)
)
|∼HAG
and the rule Modus Ponens.
Note that in A4 the ui :Fi, Fi and G are considered as propositional formulas, see the
remarks about this at section on substitutions.
As it follows from well-known results by Rybakov and Visser, the predicate F |∼HAG
is decidable, hence axioms of iBLP constitute a decidable set of formulas.
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Proposition 1. iBLP is sound for HA.
Proof. It suffices to show that for any arithmetical interpretation ∗, for all instances
A of one of the axioms, A∗ is provable in HA. We only treat the case when A is
an instance of A4 and leave the other cases to the reader. Thus A is of the form∧n
i=1(ui : Fi) → G for some ui, Fi and G such that
( ∧n






Prf (mi, F ∗i ) → G∗,
where u∗i = mi. Since Prf, being a primitive recursive predicate, is decidable in
HA, either HA ` Prf (mi, F ∗i ) for all i ≤ n, or HA ` ¬Prf (mi, F ∗i ) for some i ≤ n.
In the last case it follows immediately that A∗ is provable in HA, as in this case
HA ` ¬∧ni=1 Prf (mi, F ∗i ). We consider the first case. As HA is sound this implies
that HA ` Prf (mi, F ∗i ) ∧ F ∗i , for all i ≤ n. The fact that
(∧n
i=1(ui :Fi ∧ Fi)
)
|∼HAG
means that for all arithmetical substitutions τ , HA ` ∧ni=1 τ(ui : Fi) ∧ τ(Fi) implies
HA ` τG. As explained above, in the context of propositional logic an arithmeti-
cal interpretation can be considered as an arithmetical substitution. As we have
HA ` ∧ni=1(ui :Fi)∗ ∧ F ∗i , this therefore implies that HA ` G∗, and hence A∗ is prov-
able in HA also in this case. 2
In Section 4 we will show that iBLP is complete for HA. First, we present a more
transparent axiomatization of iBLP by providing the following replacement for A4.
Theorem 5. In the axiomatization of iBLP the axiom A4 can be replaced by the axiom
∧n
i=1(ui :Fi) → G for Fi, G such that
(∧n
i=1(Fi ∧ ui :Fi)
) `VIPC G.
Proof. By Theorem 2, |∼ IPC = |∼HA. Whence A4 can be replaced by
∧n
i=1(ui :Fi) → G for Fi, G such that
( ∧n
i=1(Fi ∧ ui :Fi)
)
|∼ IPCG.
By Theorem 1, |∼ IPC = `VIPC. This proves the theorem. 2
4 Completeness.
In this section we prove the arithmetical completeness theorem for iBLP:
Theorem 6. For finite Γ, Γ `iBLP A if and only if Γ∗ `HA A∗ for every arithmetical
interpretation ∗.
The soundness part has already been proved in Proposition 1. The proof of the
completeness is the difficult part. We first present a sketch of this proof to explain
the main idea, before we dive into the technicalities in the following sections.
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4.1 Proof sketch
Suppose Γ 6`iBLP A. We have to find an arithmetical interpretation ∗ such that
Γ∗ 6`HA A∗. First note that when neither Γ nor A contains labelled atoms, that
is atoms of the form u : B, then the theorem follows immediately from de Jongh’s
theorem.
Theorem 7. (de Jongh’s theorem [27]).
IPC ` A if and only if HA ` τA for all substitutions τ .
Indeed, since Γ 6`iBLP A, IPC 6`
∧
Γ → A. Let τ ′ be a substitution such that HA 6`
τ ′(
∧
Γ → A). Then define a substitution τ as τ ′ on the atoms that occur in Γ or A
and as ⊥ on the atoms (labelled as well as not labelled) that do not occur in Γ or
A. This substitution leads to an arithmetical interpretation in the following way. We
can construct a proof predicate Prf (x, y) such that Prf (n, m) holds if and only if
“n is a code of a derivation in HA which contains a formula having code m”,
and such that
Prf (puq, n) is false for every n and every label u.
Then we define the arithmetical interpretation (·)∗ as given by Prf as a proof predicate
and by
p∗ = τ(p) for propositional variables p
u∗ = puq for proof variables u.
Since under this interpretation τ(u :B) = ⊥ = (u :B)∗, it follows that HA ` τ(B) ↔
B∗. Whence that Γ∗ 6`HA A∗. So this shows that Theorem 6 holds when neither Γ
nor A contain labelled atoms.
What is the problem when we do not have this restriction on Γ and A? Clearly
we can extend Γ to a Θ for which Θ 6`IPC A, and u : B ∈ Θ or ¬u : B ∈ Θ for all
u :B that occur in Θ or A. De Jongh’s theorem then provides a substitution τ such
that τΘ 6`HA τA. However, the same trick as above does not work. For we need for
τ(u :B) ∈ Θ that HA proves τ(u :B) and τB. Namely, we need that τ(u :B) and τB
will become equivalent to respectively (u : B)∗, which is equivalent to Prf (u∗, B∗),
and B∗. This would imply that Prf (u∗, B∗) and B∗ are provable in HA because of
the properties of a proof predicate Prf. Whence HA should prove τ(u : B) and τB.
Such a thing however is not garanteed by the proof of de Jongh’s theorem. Nor does
it follow from the proof of the theorem as given in [27]. That nevertheless such a τ
exists is shown in the following way, which thus also provides a strengthening of de
Jongh’s theorem.
Given Γ 6`IPC A we extend Γ to Θ such that Θ 6`IPC A, and u : B ∈ Θ or ¬u : B ∈ Θ
for all u : B that occur in Γ or A. But we will require more of Θ: we will construct
it in such a way that it also contains a projective formula B that implies
∧
{C, u : C | u : C ∈ Θ} ∧
∧
{¬u : C | ¬u : C ∈ Θ}.
We call such (
∧
Θ → A) projectively saturated, the precise definition follows below.
Then we show that the existence of a projective unifier σ of B implies the following
lemma.
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Lemma 4. For every finite projectively saturated
∧
Γ → A such that Γ 6`iBLP A there
exists a substitution σ such that
1. `IPC σB ∧ σ(u :B) for all u :B ∈ Γ,
2. `IPC ¬σ(u :B) for all ¬u :B ∈ Γ,
3. σΓ 6`IPC σA.
Then the following lemma completes the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 3. If Γ, A, σ are as in Lemma 4, then there is a arithmetical interpretation
∗ such that Γ∗ 6`HA A∗.
Thus the completeness proof (Theorem 6) consists of the proofs of the two main
lemma’s: Lemma 4, which shows that such a σ exists, and Lemma 3, which constructs
the desired arithmetical interpretation on the basis of such a σ.
4.2 Projective saturation.
In this section we give the definition of projective saturation and prove that for every
Γ 6`iBLP A there is a Θ ⊇ Γ such that
∧
Θ → A is projectively saturated.
Definition 6. For a given set X of iBLP-formulas we define
X0 ≡def {B, u :B | u :B ∈ X}
X1 ≡def X0 ∪ {¬u :B | ¬u :B ∈ X}
Π̄Γ denotes Π̄(VΓ), similarly for ΠΓ. An implication (
∧
Γ → A) is called projectively
saturated if
Γ is consistent (in iBLP);
Γ ∩ΠΓ1 is nonempty;
u :B ∈ Γ or ¬u :B ∈ Γ, for all u :B that occur in Γ or A.
We say that a formula A occurs in a set of formulas ∆ when A is a subformula of one
of the formulas in ∆.
Lemma 2. If Γ 6`iBLP A, then there exists a projectively saturated (
∧
Θ → A) such
that Θ ⊇ Γ and Θ 6`iBLP A. If Γ is finite, we can take Θ finite.
Proof. First construct ∆ ⊇ Γ such that ∆ 6`iBLP A, and u :B ∈ ∆ or ¬u :B ∈ ∆, for
all u :B that occur in ∆ or A. ∆ can be obtained by standard saturation techniques.
It is finite when Γ is finite. Let Π∆0 be a finite projective approximation of
∧
∆0
(Section 2.4). Recall that all atoms occurring in Π∆0 occur in ∆0 too. Since ∆0 `VIPC∨
Π∆0 , by Theorem 4, we have ∆ `iBLP
∨
Π∆0 , by the axioms of iBLP (Theorem 5).
Therefore, there is a C ∈ Π∆0 such that ∆∧C 6`iBLP A. For if not, ∆∧
∨
Π∆0 `iBLP A,
and whence ∆ `iBLP A. Note that C `IPC
∧
∆0 by the definition of Π∆0 . Let
B = C ∧ {¬u :D | ¬u :D ∈ ∆}
and Θ = ∆ ∪ {B}. Note that Θ 6`iBLP A and that Θ1 = ∆1. Therefore, it remains to
show that (
∧
Θ → A) is projectively saturated, for which it suffices to show that
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1. Θ is consistent,
2. u :D ∈ Θ or ¬u :D ∈ Θ, for all u :D that occur in Θ or A,
3. B `IPC Θ1 and B is projective.
The first statement follows from Θ 6`iBLP A. For the second statement, consider a
u :D that occurs in Θ or A. Thus u :D occurs in ∆ or B or A, and thus in ∆, by the
definition of ∆ and of C. The construction of ∆ implies that whence u : D ∈ ∆ or
¬u :D ∈ ∆, which implies the statement. For the last statement, the projectivity of
B follows from the projectivity of C by Lemma 1. For B `IPC Θ1, consider u :D ∈ Θ.
Thus u : D ∈ ∆, and thus D, u : D ∈ ∆0. Hence C `IPC D ∧ u : D, as C `IPC
∧
∆0.
Hence B `IPC D∧u :D. That B `IPC ¬u :D for ¬u :D ∈ Θ follows from the definition
of B and Θ1 = ∆1. 2
4.3 Main lemma’s.
The main part of the completeness proof lies in the following lemma that shows
that the existence of certain substitutions suffices to construct certain arithmetical
interpretations.
Lemma 3. If for some finite projectively saturated (
∧
Γ → A), Γ 6`iBLP A and there
is a substitution σ such that
1. `IPC σB ∧ σ(u :B) for all u :B ∈ Γ,
2. `IPC ¬σ(u :B) for all ¬u :B ∈ Γ,
3. σΓ 6`IPC σA,
then there is a arithmetical interpretation ∗ such that Γ∗ 6`HA A∗.
Proof. Let
∧
Γ → A be as in the lemma. Let ◦ denote composition of substitutions.
By de Jongh’s theorem (Theorem 7), using the fact that Γ is finite, there is a substi-
tution τ ′ such that τ ′ ◦ σ(Γ) 6`HA τ ′ ◦ σ(A). Let τ = τ ′ ◦ σ. Thus τΓ 6`HA τA. Recall
that σ, τ ′ and τ treat formulas u :B as propositional variables. Note that
∀u :B ∈ Γ HA ` τB ∧ τ(u :B) and ∀¬u :B ∈ Γ HA ` ¬τ(u :B). (1)
We pick a Gödel numbering of the joint language of iBLP and HA that is injective,
i.e. such that
pAq = pBq ↔ A and B coincide.
We define a desired arithmetical interpretation ∗ by a fixed point construction in a
similar way as in [4]. First for a given proof predicate Prf (x, y) we define an auxiliary
translation (·)+ as follows:
p+ = τ(p) for propositional variables p,
u+ = puq for proof variables u
(u :B)+ = Prf (u+, pB+q)
(·)+ commutes with connectives
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Let PROOF (x, y) denote a standard nondeterministic proof predicate
x is a code of a derivation in HA which contains a formula having a code y.
Without loss of generality we assume that PROOF (puq, n) is false for any proof
variable u and any n ∈ ω. By the arithmetical fixed point argument we construct a
formula Prf (x, y) such that HA proves the following fixed point equation:
Prf (x, y) ↔ PROOF (x, y) ∨ “x = puq for some proof variable u and
y = pB+q for some iBLP-formula B such that u :B ∈ Γ”
Consider the arithmetical interpretation (·)∗ given by Prf as a proof predicate and
by
p∗ = τ(p) for propositional variables p
u∗ = puq for proof variables u.
The following claims imply that Prf is indeed a proof predicate and that Γ∗ 6`HA A∗,
and whence complete the proof of the theorem.
Claim 4. For all B, B+ = B∗. For all B that occur in Γ or A, HA ` B∗ ↔ τB. For
all proof variables u, u+ = u∗.
Proof of the claim. The last statement holds by definition. For the first statement
we use formula induction. If B is a propositional letter, B+ = τ(B) = B∗. If
B = u : C, B+ = Prf (puq, pB+q) = Prf (u∗, pB∗q) = B∗ because puq = u∗ and
B+ = B∗ by IH, whence pB+q = pB∗q. The steps corresponding to the connectives
follow easily.
The second statement is also proved by formula induction. Consider a B that
occurs in Γ or A. If B is a propositional letter it follows by definition. If B = u :C,
either u : C ∈ Γ or ¬u : C ∈ Γ, as Γ → A is projectively saturated. If u : C ∈ Γ,
then HA ` τ(u :C) by (1). By the fixed point equation above, HA ` Prf (u+, pC+q),
whence HA ` (u :C)+. By the first statement of the claim this implies HA ` (u :C)∗.
Thus HA ` (u : C)∗ ↔ τ(u : C). The case that ¬u : C ∈ Γ is similar. The steps
corresponding to the connectives are easy.
Claim 5. HA ` ϕ if and only if Prf (n, pϕq) for some n ∈ ω.
Proof of the claim. The direction from left to right is clear, as the standard proof
predicate PROOF is contained in Prf. For the direction from right to left, we dis-
tinguish two cases: PROOF (n, pϕq) or n = puq and pϕq = pB+q for some proof
variable u and some iBLP-formula B such that u : B ∈ Γ. In the first case, HA ` ϕ
follows because PROOF is the standard proof predicate. In the second case, note
that u : B ∈ Γ implies HA ` τB by (1). Thus, by the previous claim and the fact
that B occurs in Γ, HA ` B+. By assumption on the Gödel numbering, ϕ and B+
coincide, which gives HA ` ϕ. This finishes the proof of the lemma. 2
Lemma 4. For every finite projectively saturated
∧
Γ → A such that Γ 6`iBLP A there
exists a substitution σ such that
1. `IPC σB ∧ σ(u :B) for all u :B ∈ Γ,
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2. `IPC ¬σ(u :B) for all ¬u :B ∈ Γ,
3. σΓ 6`IPC σA.
Proof. Let B ∈ Γ ∩ ΠΓ1 , which exists because
∧
Γ → A is projectively saturated.
Thus B is projective and B `IPC
∧
Γ1. Let σ be a projective unifier for B, i.e. a
substitution such that
`IPC σB and ∀D (B ` D ↔ σD).
We show that σ fulfills the conditions of Lemma 3, i.e.
1. `IPC σC ∧ σ(u :C) for all u :C ∈ Γ,
2. `IPC ¬σ(u :C) for all ¬u :C ∈ Γ,
3. σΓ 6`IPC σA.
Recall (Section 2.4) that
{D | B `IPC D} = {D | `IPC σD}.
To show 1., consider u : D ∈ Γ. Then D ∈ Γ1 and u : D ∈ Γ1. As B `IPC
∧
Γ1, this
gives B `IPC D ∧ u :D, and thus `IPC σD ∧ σ(u :D). For 2. the reasoning is the same.
For 3., note that since Γ `IPC B and Γ 6`iBLP A, we have B 6`IPC
∧
Γ → A, and thus
6`IPC σ(
∧
Γ → A). 2
4.4 Completeness proof.
Here we finish the proof of Theorem 6. Assume Γ 6`iBLP A. By Lemma 2, there is
a finite Θ ⊇ Γ such that ∧ Θ → A is projectively saturated and Θ 6`iBLP A. We
show that there is an arithmetical interpretation such that Θ∗ 6`HA A∗. By Lemma 4
there exists a substitution σ which fullfills the conditions of Lemma 3 (reading Θ for
Γ). Whence there exists an arithmetical interpretation ∗ such that Θ∗ 6`HA A∗ by
Lemma 3. Whence Γ∗ 6`HA A∗, and we are done.
5 Discussion.
The next step in building intuitionistic logic of proofs iLP should be adding to iBLP
operation on proofs. The are some natural choices for sets of operations. In order to
get the internalization property
A1, A2, . . . , An `iLP B
u1 :A1, u2 :A2, . . . , un :An `iLP t(u1, u2, . . . , un) :B
we could consider adding operations similar to application “◦” and proof checker
“!” (cf. [4]). Furthermore, by adding also the choice operation “+”, we will gain
a capacity to naturally capture the intuitionistic version of the modal logic S4 and
hence the modal λ-calculus [11, 25, 26]. Note, that in iLP every admissible rule of HA
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will be represented by a proof term. Indeed, consider an admissible rule F/G. Then
u :F → G for some proof variable u not occurring in F,G is an axiom of iBLP, hence a
theorem of iLP. By internalization, there should be a (ground) proof term g such that
`iLP g : (u :F → G). Using application we can conclude that `iLP v :u :F → (g ◦ v) :G.
Substituting !v for u we get `iLP v : !v :F → (g◦v) :G). By the proof checker operation,
`iLP v :F → v : !v :F , and hence `iLP v :F → (g ◦ v) :G). The latter shows that a proof
term g ◦ v represents in iLP the rule F/G.
The explicit axiomatization of admissible rules by Visser’s series Vn = Fn/Gn
established in [18, 19, 20] allows us to guess a more concise formulation of iLP in style
of the classical logic of proofs LP.
Definition 7. The intuitionistic logic of proofs, iLP, consists of the following axioms
and rules:
A1 Axioms of IPC
A2 t :F → F
A3 s : (F → G) → (t :F → (s · t) :G application
A4 t :F → t : !t :F proof checker
A5 s :F → (s + t) :F,
t :F → (s + t) :F choice operation
A6 t :F ∨ ¬t :F
A7n t :Fn → fn(t) :Gn, fn is a functional symbol specific for Vn
R1 Modus Ponens
R2 c :A, c is a proof constant, A ∈ A1−A7n
This system is obviously sound with respect to the provability interpretation where
operations ·, !, +, fn are interpreted the intended way. It is easy to see that iLP enjoys
internalization property and contains proof terms for each admissible rule in IPC. We
conjecture that this system is also arithmetically complete and believe, this fact could
be established within the circle of ideas presented in this note and in [4].
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